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By Seymour L. Halleck,
M.D. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.
At this point in time, public concern about crime and social disorder
verges on a state of panic. These fear reactions are making their mark on
legislators, and the community is in grave risk of initiating regressive
responses which will further delay a rational approach to criminal
behavior. Thus, Dr. Halleck's book arrives at a moment when its insights
are much needed. It provides the reader with an overall view of criminal
behavior as a "natural phenomenon" to be studied from the standpoint of
the "advantages it offers to the criminal," as well as the consequences it
involves for society. In other words, rather than merely describing
criminal behavior and moralizing about it, the author demonstrates its
function as an adaptive response to a multitude of causal factors. If those
concerned with crime and social disorder are serious about their desire
to modify as well as control these serious social problems, they must deal
with the substance of Dr. Halleck's arguments.
The author presents us with a refreshingly objective approach to
the phenomenology of criminal behavior. He avoids the tendency to make
unwitting value judgments about criminal behavior and criminals, and
assiduously sticks to the area of his principal competence: the analysis
of the internal psychological forces in a given criminal, and the way in
which they impinge upon his social environment. Dr. Halleck's knowledge
and perspective are derived from considerable experience in working
directly with criminals in the federal as well as state correctional departments. His theoretical approach cannot be faulted for lack of knowledge
about either substantive criminal law or psychiatric theory and principle,
and he demonstrates a thorough-going awareness of the literature of
criminology and sociology. He delineates explicitly the role conflicts
which psychiatrists encounter when they work in the legal context and
demonstrates the manner in which such role confusion often causes
bizarre results both in court and in correctional institutions.'
Most of those working in correctional settings lack the training and
competence of Dr. Halleck, which in part accounts for the unwillingness
of corrections departments to modify treatment techniques. This recalcitrance closes a vicious circle and makes it difficult or impossible to
recruit the more competent psychiatrists to work in this field. In addition,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME.

1. Though it is often alleged that the treatment techniques of psychiatry have
failed to alleviate criminal behavior, any reasonable analysis of the past leads to the
flat conclusion that we have hardly ever utilized the knowledge we now possess, nor
have we experimented with any new techniques for dealing with criminal behavior.

BOOK REVIEWS
competence such as Dr. Halleck's is very expensive and therefore corrections departments have not yet been willing to hire the more skilled
members of the therapeutic community. While it may be legitimately
argued that other community needs are of higher priority, if we do so
we may not then say that treatment techniques have failed. Rather we
should acknowledge our unwillingness to provide adequate services.
These facts are well delineated in this volume.
Halleck's book has certain attributes which made it difficult for this
reviewer to evaluate it accurately. Because of the author's lucid style
and his straightforward way of presenting knotty theoretical materials,
I had a tendency to become somewhat bored with the basic concepts
presented, with which I was highly familiar. It is the same reaction one
has when reading several of the classics in the field of psychiatric theory.
While reading such a book one has the sensation that "nothing new is
presented." 2 If I am correct, this is a strong recommendation of the
book for all those interested in learning about the causes of criminal
behavior.
One point which Dr. Halleck appropriately emphasizes, is the social
responsibility of psychiatrists to use their medical skills in order "to
prevent emotionally disturbed offenders from hurting others and a moral
responsibility to try to prevent any persons from hurting themselves."'
In other words, the role of the psychiatrist should not solely involve
him with the patient and his needs, but should also draw him into the
context of dealing with community problems. I heartily concur with Dr.
Halleck and disagree vigorously with psychiatrists who view their role
as being exclusively related to the problems of individual treatment.
Such an attitude is short-sighted and at marked variance with current
views on the community approach to mental illness.
Few, if any, of the books on criminal behavior written by psychiatrists possess the scope of this volume. The Isaac Ray Lectures, given by
prominent psychiatrists, many of whom have worked in correctional
settings, have never synthesized the breadth of material found in this
book.' They tended to deal with such matters as psychiatric testimony,
2. For example, this is the reaction most people will have upon reading Anna
Freud's classical study on The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (A. FREUD, THE
EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE (1937)). That volume, a pioneering scientific
study of psychological protective mechanisms, is so beautifully written that it presents
complex ideas with a simplicity which at first glance invites contempt However, let
the reader attempt to describe what he has read.
3. J. BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW OF HOMICIDE (1955);
M. GUTTmAcHER, THE MIND OF THE MURDERER (1960); W. OVERHOLSER, THE

(1953); P. ROCHE, THE CRImINIAL MIND (1958); H.
WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH (1956); G. ZILBOoRG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE
PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW

CRmINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT

(1954).
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motives of criminality, problems of the substantive definition of crimes,
and the historical relationship of psychiatry to the criminal law. Dr.
Halleck covers all of these subjects and, in addition, explores the sociological implications of psychiatric theory to the science of criminology.
Thus, his volume recommends itself for its synthetic approach as well
as for its treatment of specific issues.
With the exception of Dr. Philip Q. Roche, few other American
psychiatrists writing about corrections have had extensive and in depth
experience with actual correctional situations. There are several European psychiatrists such as Sturiip in Denmark,4 and Jones in England,5
who have spent their professional careers working with correctional
problems and have written extensively on the subject. It is the reviewer's
impression, however, that these authors lack the kind of skill which has
permitted Dr. Halleck to penetrate so deeply into the psychological
dynamisms related to criminal behavior.
Dr. Halleck's book raises many questions concerning how psychological theory can be introduced into appropriate relationships with law
and legal personnel. As he points out, the most common point of contact
is in the context of expert testimony in criminal trials involving the
insanity defense. In a section called "The Urge to Testify"6 Halleck
explores the nature of this contact and views it as largely abortive in its
impact. W\Vhile the reviewer would agree with the conclusion, it does not
lead him to the same judgment about appropriateness. Here I believe
that Halleck lacks perspective as to the way legal processes change. He
does not adequately credit the impact of trial cases on legislative action.
Court incidents which focus attention upon expert witnesses and their
views about sentencing and treatment often help shape legislation. This
reviewer has had several experiences with legislatures which support this
contention. In effect, demonstration of the negative utility of a rule or
procedure may foster change in the community's technique for handling
deviant behavior. The fact that a certain procedural device fails to
accomplish its desired purpose is evidence which can bring about change.
Also, failure to make such demonstrations leaves open the omnipresent
opportunity for the "explanation" that the expert does not "know" what
he is talking about because he has never participated in the process.
For this reason, as a matter of social process, it appears necessary that
these negative demonstrations be made with respect to procedural devices
as well as substantive rules of law.
STUROP, TREATING THE "UNTREATABLE" (1968).
M. JONES, THE THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY (1953).
6. S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME
cited as HALLECK).

4.

G.

5.

221 (1967) (hereinafter

BOOK REVIEWS
It is my impression that more often than not the so-called "battle
of expert witnesses" is a battle of "inexperts"; inexpert lawyers and
inexpert psychiatrists groping at the issues of each other's domain, which
neither understand. The end result is a potpourri of irrelevancies. The
actual issues in the trial are not truly confronted nor considered. I
fully agree with Dr. Halleck in his contention that the expert should
always "say how it is." While there are some jurisdictions in which this
is procedurally difficult or impossible, usually it is the expert's lack of
sophistication about the legal process which causes his chopped-up and
circumstantial presentation. If he knew more about the legal procedures
involved, he would be able to say what he thought and thus put the
matter where it belongs-in the hands of the factfinders. Often he does
not even understand that he is not the factfinder, and much of his
dissatisfaction results from this basic misapprehension of role. This fact,
coupled with the historical accretion of procedures and ideas which
shunt criminal procedures far from their original purposes, results in
many deficiencies in the process by which lawyers and courts attempt to
utilize psychiatric information.
There is no doubt whatever that the earliest purpose of all "criminal
law" was to deliver retributive punishment to those who broke the law.
Punishments were simple expressions of the biological response to hit
and hurt anyone who had caused either fear or injury. It has been many
years since any criminal law philosopher would acknowledge that the
law deliberately retains this function. Generally, retribution is hidden
away in what, to me, is largely a psychological rationalization: "We need
to punish you in order to prevent others from doing as you have done."
Thus the concept of deterrence is utilized as a rationalization for, the
unacknowledged desire to be retributive. If we as a society continue to
wish to be retributive, then we should acknowledge this wish and go
about it more directly, for there are easier and cheaper ways to carry it
out than those we now utilize.
Of course there is an omnipresent need in the criminal law to protect
society from the "dangerous," and this need will always have relevance.
The incapacitation of all persons who have committed dangerous acts
and who continue to be dangerous must remain a central purpose of
criminal law procedures and a necessary ingredient of their validity.
But concomitant with the maturing process of a society, the free
expression of aggression is proscribed more and more, even in the service
of "punishment." Simultaneously there is a mounting desire to "understand" the criminal motive and, in progressively widening circumstances,
to relieve the malefactor of legal guilt and the imposition of mere
retribution. One may trace the latter development in religious doctrines
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and philosophical discussions as well as in criminal codes. Because of the
persistent unconscious and hidden fear of those who cause social harm,
the conflicting impulses of "understanding" and punishment often result
in legal as well as social confusion. This confusion is reflected in the
anomalous development of the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity
side by side with the concept of diminished responsibility and inens rea.7
It is my impression that as the criminal law evolves some new
element is often grafted onto an already complex structure without a
consideration of what the purpose of the change shall be, and confusion
ensues. In the face of such confusion we should not be surprised that nonlawyers, when they encounter the legal system, suffer great pangs of
anxiety emanating from their lack of comprehension about the circumstances in which they find themselves. If the lawyers appear not to understand clearly what they are doing, an outsider has no hope of doing so.
We find a good example of this phenomenon in relation to the issue of
competence to stand trial when the defense of insanity may also be relevant. Here judges, lawyers, and expert witnesses alike, frequently if
not usually, confuse the two factual issues, and pandemonium necessarily
follows. Halleck generally distinguishes these two legal issues,' but he
could have demonstrated more clearly how the two matters relate conceptually to each other. Had he provided more legal and philosophical
perspective, there would have been a higher degree of explicitness for
the non-lawyer reader when he dealt with them substantively. While he
decries the confusion which exists in this area of law, he does not fully
elucidate why the confusion exists. Only for the reader who knows the
history of the concept, is the substance of the discussion fully meaningful.
Another criticism I have of the book, and most others like it, is
that it provides too few suggestions for positive change. One cannot
disagree with the basic proposition that the utilization of behavioral
experts has been confused and often useless in the past. However, few
ideas are proffered as to how we might proceed from current practices
to others more valuable. These problems relate to the educational status
of the experts currently working in the criminal court setting. In my
opinion there is no chance for bringing changes there until large numbers
of the personnel working in law understand something of the nature of
the problems. This will probably not occur until current and future
7. It should be quite clear, that when conditions exist which can render a person
not guilty by reason of insanity, a person cannot possess the appropriate inens rea to be
found guilty of the substantive crime. This anomaly has been delineated clearly only
recently. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE ch. 12 & 13 (1967)

and Dixon,

A Legacy of Hadfield, M'Naghten and Maclean, 31 AusTL. L.J. 255-66 (1957). When
these divergent purposes meet in the context of substantive law, confusion ensues.
8.

HALLECK 226.
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generations of law students have been subjected to a different kind of
educational experience. As with all social change, society must be educated
as to the complexities of a problem before it will accept modifications
which on their face appear dangerous. Current political discussions about
crime and social unrest seem to illustrate this point. The assassination of
several political leaders has been sufficient to stimulate a markedly
regressive reaction about how to treat criminals. This response demonstrates the truism that the civilized veneer of society is very thin indeed
and, while not surprising, it must be taken into account when we consider
changes in legal procedure or definition. It leads me to the conviction
that it is important for psychiatrists to participate in the legal process
even when we do not accomplish the immediate results we might wish.
The long range educational impact of such participation is vitally important to the process of social and legal evolution.
The principal value of this book lies in its expert delineation of the
causes of criminal and anti-social behavior, and it should be very useful
to those who seek to understand these matters. Then slowly, through
work in courts, correctional systems, and other social agencies, the idea
may slowly emerge that the greatest security for society rests in a system
of criminal law which is based essentially on three propositions:
First, the appropriate incapacitation of individuals in relation to
social judgment of the degree of dangerousness for as long as that dangerousness continues must be embodied in the system.
Second, treatment programs should be aimed completely at rehabilitation. By this I mean that treatment programs should seek to minimize
the personality and social deterioration of those under their jurisdictions,
and every effort should be made, within the limits of resource availability,
to modify the social and emotional factors which cause the anti-social
behavior. This approach encompasses whatever deterrent potential may
exist for that individual as well as for others. We must remember that, in
the last analysis, deterrence is a totally personal .process. Appropriate
rehabilitation is a deterrent to an individual and the image of this kind of
treatment system will affect whatever general deterrent result there may
be, as well.
Third, procedures for treating criminals should do everything possible to bring into high visibility society's and the criminal's unconscious
attitudes toward the proscribed behavior. This approach is the only way
in which society's retributive impulses and the criminal's self-serving need
to be punished can be handled. Otherwise there is an inevitable tendency
for the law to develop covert goals responsive to these unconscious forces.
In so doing, society facilitates the omnipresent need on the part of many
deviant persons to use the punishment potential of the law to balance their
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own psychic economy. A reading of Dr. Halleck's descriptions of the
motives for deviant behavior readily demonstrates the importance of
this principle.
It should be obvious that this kind of individualization in the
application of the criminal code demands expert skill. It verges on the
trite to repeat that the most difficult task a criminal court judge faces is
to carry out his sentencing function. It is most ironic that at present
most judges have no training whatever for fulfilling this important
function. Recently a few jurisdictions, for example California, have
moved toward placing this function in the hands of a diagnostic and
treatment authority. Under such plans, except in the case of short term
prisoners, the sentencing discretion is removed from the judge and
placed with the diagnosticians in the Corrections Department who make
the treatment decisions. Programs are individually tailored to fit the
psychodynamic needs of the prisoner and the security problems he poses
for the community commensurate with the treatment options realistically
available to the community. This approach would remove the impetuous
and disparate sentencing so characteristic of the current system and is
surely the only sensible way we may proceed.9
While judges properly concern themselves with the issue of equitable application of the law, they are in no position to implement the
treatment goals. Because the "sense of justice" relates in high degree to
many subjective elements in the prisoner, it cannot be adequately dealt
,with solely by the judiciary. For this reason there is a vastly higher
potential for making the kinds of personalized interpretations needed to
evoke a sense of justice, when they are made by experts. Such a treatment
body, as mentioned, functions within a single frame of reference, and can
directly implement and interpret the judiciary's decisions with respect
to the individual prisoners involved.
There is a rapidly growing trend in the law schools of this country
to develop this kind of teaching. It has arisen in the context of "education
for professionalism." 1 This trend has been in response to an increasing
awareness that law students, when they leave the better law schools of the
United States, have little preparation to deal with the knotty problems
of involvement as members of the professional community. The programs
supported by the OEO, as well as others with more direct educational
9. A further example of this concern is to be found in the model sentencing act
promulgated by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. See S. RuBIN,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW ch. 9 (1965). Under their suggested procedure,
the judge may set only a maximum sentence, and the treatment program is formulated
by the diagnostic experts in the corrections department.
10. For my discussion of this subject see Watson, The Quest for Professional
Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CINN. L. REv. 93-166

(1968).
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concerns, for example some of the projects funded by the Ford Foundation, contain the premise that students must have a guided experience of
involvement with clients and their emotions. I vigorously support this
view, and believe it will be one of the dominant concerns of the future.
Then materials such as Dr. Halleck's will come into their own, to be
incorporated in ways which will render them most useful.
In summary, Dr. Halleck has given us an excellent panoramic view
of the ways in which psychiatrists may involve themselves in the substance and procedure of the law as it deals with criminal deviation. His
views accurately reflect contemporary approaches to the motivational and
social forces which produce such deviancy. While he does not, in my view,
adequately set such approaches in full perspective in relation to the
philosophy of the criminal law, the book is in a form which will readily
facilitate others doing so. Some of his concepts regarding change I do
not share, and I relate those matters to questions of perspective which I
described. However, I must conclude by saying that this book is one of
the most effective yet written on the subject of criminal behavior. It
effectively demonstrates the potential which the psychiatric profession
has for providing highly useful information to lawyers and the law.
ANDREW S. WATSONt
M.D., Professor of Law, Professor of Psychiatry, University of Michigan.

